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Audit Culture Revisited
Rankings, Ratings, and the Reassembling of Society
by Cris Shore and Susan Wright
The spread of the principles and techniques of ﬁnancial accounting into new systems for measuring, ranking, and
auditing performance represents one of the most important and deﬁning features of contemporary governance.
Audit procedures are redeﬁning accountability, transparency, and good governance and reshaping the way orga-
nizations and individuals have to operate. They also undermine professional autonomy and have unanticipated and
dysfunctional consequences. Taking up the concept of audit culture as an analytical framework, we examine the
origins, spread, and rationality driving these new ﬁnancialized techniques of governance, not least through the work
of the Big Four accountancy ﬁrms, and trace their impact across a number of ﬁelds, from administration and the
military to business corporations and universities. We ask, what new kinds of ethics of accountability does audit
produce? Building on Mitchell (1999), Strathern (2000a), Trouillot (2001), and Merry (2011), we identify how the
techniques and logics of ﬁnancial accountancy have ﬁve audit effects. These are “domaining,” “classiﬁcatory,”
“individualizing and totalizing,” “governance,” and “perverse” effects. We conclude by reﬂecting on the problems of
audit culture and suggest ways to reclaim the professional values and democratic spaces that are being eroded by
these new systems of governing by numbers.
Rankings are part of a global movement that is redeﬁning
accountability, transparency, and good governance in
terms of quantitative measures . . . they diminish the sa-
lience of local knowledge and professional autonomy, they
absorb vast resources, and they insinuate and extend
market logic. (Sauder and Espeland 2009:80)
Ever since anthropologists started to engage with the ideas of
Michel Foucault, the discipline has recognized that seem-
ingly mundane routines often have the most profound im-
pact on the manner in which people are governed. Whether
it is awarding smileys for customer satisfaction with the clean-
liness of airport toilets, collecting points to win the Walmart
Employee of the Month certiﬁcate, or competing for the Best
Student Experience Award and counting academic publica-
tions to brand one’s college as a “center of world excellence,”
enumeration and classiﬁcation lie at the heart of such every-
day forms of management. These mundane practices also
provide critical insights into regimes of governance and the
operation of power. The use of indicators, measurements, and
rankings have become increasingly pervasive, both as instru-
ments in the internal management of organizations and in the
external representations of their quality, efﬁciency, and ac-
countability to the wider public. As Sally Merry (2011) notes,
“indicators are rapidly multiplying as tools for measuring
and promoting reform strategies around the world” (S52).
They are also increasingly used to assess performance and
encourage people to think of themselves as calculating, re-
sponsible, self-managing subjects. But it is not just the use of
numerical indicators and rankings that has become a key ele-
ment of contemporary regimes of governance: increasingly,
the principles and practices of modern accounting and ﬁnan-
cial control are being applied to contexts far removed from
the world of bookkeeping and corporate management. It is
the widespread proliferation of these calculative rationalities
of modern ﬁnancial accounting and their effects on individ-
uals and organizations that we term “audit culture.”
In this paper, we trace how the principles and technologies
of grading and ranking have traveled from education to the
military and industry and, despite appalling failures, have
further been translated into the public sector during the 1980s
and beyond. As Rose and Miller (1992) observed, these “cal-
culative practices . . . should be analyzed as ‘technologies of
government’ ” (183). While these mechanisms make govern-
ment reforms operable, they also recast political programs as
mundane administrative and technical matters to be dealt with
by experts, thereby masking their ideological content and re-
moving them from the realm of contestable politics (Burchell
1993; Miller 2001; Shore and Wright 1997). Since the 1990s,
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such political technologies have been expanded as vehicles for
assessing the quality, efﬁciency, and, increasingly, the organi-
zational effectiveness of municipal services, hospitals, schools,
NGOs, and businesses. Today, the creditworthiness of chari-
ties, utility companies, airlines, universities, and even entire
countries is measured and rated. All have been reduced to
numbers and competitively ranked in league tables. These
technologies have intensiﬁed as governments and other or-
ganizations have sought to mobilize their assets to compete
more successfully in the global knowledge economy. As a re-
sult, a new industry of proﬁtable activities inmeasuring, account-
ing, ranking, and benchmarking has emerged across numerous
professional ﬁelds (Olds 2010; Robertson et al. 2012). Equally
importantly, a new language of accountability has come to dom-
inate organizations. Audits and performance indicators have
been combined with new clusters of words such as “quality,”
“efﬁciency,” “effectiveness,” “value for money,” and “transpar-
ency” andwithinnew ideologies (Bruneau andSavage2002:12).
As Strathern (2000a) noted, audits have come to embody a new
form of ethics: they are where “the ﬁnancial and the moral
meet” (1).
To analyze these developments, we address four related
sets of questions:
1. What can be learned about these practices by examining
their origins and spread? How should we analyze and theorize
their effects?
2. Who are the “rankers” today, and how do they operate?
Who are the main actors that make up this new industry,
and what role do the Big Four international auditing and
accountancy ﬁrms and other ranking bodies play in shaping
its development?
3. Why have governments and managers adopted these
auditing practices? What are the rationales—explicit as well
implicit—that are driving change, and how are they legiti-
mized by managers and policy makers? We argue that mea-
surement and ranking have become central components of a
“total accountability” governance system based on compe-
tition between nations, institutions, and individuals. Actors,
whether organizations or individuals, are constructed as “ac-
countable selves” and free agents, who succeed by mobiliz-
ing their resources and managing their behavior to optimize
“what counts.”
4. Finally, we ask, Where is this trajectory leading, and is
its relentless expansion inevitable? Just as Weber (2002 [1904])
wrote about the iron cage of bureaucracy and its inevitable
onslaught as both a cause and effect of rationalization and
modernity, is audit an unstoppable “glass cage” of coercive
transparency? How can we reclaim the professional auton-
omy and trust that audit practices appear to strip out of the
workplace? Is it possible to sustain critical practice when what
counts in modern rankings no longer reﬂects the central role
and purpose of a professional and public institution?
We argue that the interaction of these contemporary pro-
cesses of enumeration, ranking, and governance; the ﬁnan-
cialized relationships they create; and the new forms of per-
formance and accountability these give rise to can be usefully
framed and analyzed using the concept of audit culture. As we
have argued elsewhere (Shore 2008; Shore and Wright 1999,
2000; Wright 2012), audit culture refers to contexts where the
principles, techniques, and rationale of ﬁnancial accounting
have become central organizing principles in all aspects of
society, from the provision of safe nurseries and the trans-
formation of government to the execution of war. In stating
this, we are not proposing audit as a metatype of society
alongside alternatives such as feudal society, capitalist society,
or postindustrial society. Rather, we see audit culture as a ra-
tionality of governance and a corresponding set of dispositions
and practices. It therefore refers to a condition or constellation
of processes. This is similar to what Foucault (1980) called a
formation, or dispositif. Put simply, audit culture refers to
contexts where auditing has become a central organizing
principle of society.
As many anthropological concepts do, audit culture com-
bines both emic and etic elements: it is both an experiential
phenomenon and an analytical model that helps identify and
theorize key processes and trends that are reshaping every-
day social relations and cultural practices. In saying this, we
are not suggesting that audit culture is something monolithic
or uniform. Indeed, audit practices work in diverse ways and
have different meanings and ramiﬁcations in different con-
texts. Nor are we trying to map or label a range of audit cul-
tures, as if each context constituted a discrete or bounded
entity. Instead, we use the concept of audit culture to refer to
a family of resemblances in Wittgenstein’s (1953) sense of
the term, that is, where each incidence entails some forms
of ﬁnancializing logic and some instrumental techniques of
enumeration and commensuration. When combined, these
form an individualizing and totalizing system of account-
ability, but the precise constellation of features and the ways
they work together vary, as do the politics of their adoption
and resistance. The expansion of auditing into new domains
of practice is more than simply policy transfer: it has brought
about a wholesale transformation in the ways in which indi-
viduals, organizations, and even countries are now managed
and governed. We illustrate below how this “domaining” pro-
cess often results in unanticipated and even perverse effects
on individual and organizational behavior when people are
incentivized to compete and perform according to the new
norms of accounting. As Albert Einstein famously remarked,
“Not everything that is countable counts, and not everything
that counts is countable.” The important issue to probe here
is what audits and rankings bring into focus and what they
render invisible or unsayable. This is where auditing and rank-
ing also become questions of governance and power.
Toward a Theory and Genealogy of Audit
One of the ﬁrst scholars to identify and analyze the rise of
auditing and its effects on society was professor of account-
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ing and philosopher Michael Power. Writing in Britain in
the early 1990s and reﬂecting on a decade of radical Con-
servative governments under Margaret Thatcher and John
Major, Power noted the extraordinary proliferation of formal
auditing and monitoring systems. As well as ﬁnancial audits,
there were now “environmental audits,” “public spending au-
dits,” “waste management” audits, “democracy audits,” “tech-
nology and computing audits,” “teaching audits,” “academic
audits,” “value for money” audits, “land and water resource au-
dits, media audits, medical audits—even stress audits” and
“audits of auditing systems” (Power 1994:1). These trends
continued under Britain’s 1997 New Labour government and
spread to many other countries, particularly those that em-
braced neoliberal agendas. Power further developed this anal-
ysis inTheAudit Society (1997), which aptly described audits as
“rituals of veriﬁcation” and noted their often perverse effects.
Paradoxically, these included increasing levels of mistrust, as
trust and professional judgments came to be replaced by
formal systems of auditing and inspection (O’Neil 2002).
Since 2000, systems for turning everyday life into measure-
ments and competitive rankings have expanded to include all
kinds of new phenomena, from hospital waiting times, am-
bulance response rates, trafﬁc safety, and household carbon
footprints to crime, corruption, air pollution, risk, and even
“fear,” which is now measured as a proxy for falls in the value
of stocks and shares. The appetite for rating systems and
league table comparisons seems to have become a populist
project. Examples of recently coined measures include the
global sports television channel ESPN’s Ultimate Degree of
Difﬁculty Grid; the Global Innovation Index (GII), sponsored
by the United Nations’ Intellectual Property Organization;
the Global Creativity Index (GCI), produced by the Martin
Prosperity Institute; Fortune Magazine’s ranking of the Most
Admired Companies for their human resources practices; the
Bhutan government–sponsored Global Gross National Hap-
piness Index; and the Happy Planet Index, which measures
sustainable well-being for Friends of the Earth and the Soil
Association. Condom manufacturer Durex now conducts an
annual 26-country “sexual well-being survey,”which purports
to measure how many people have weekly sex and with what
level of satisfaction. Its 2011 online survey, for example, re-
vealed that Russians had the most sex (80%) but that only
42% were satisﬁed, whereas 53% of Americans had weekly
sex and 48% were satisﬁed, and 34% of Japanese had weekly
sex but only 15% were satisﬁed (Durex 2011).
There is nothing new about the use of quantitative indi-
cators and performance measurements. However, what is dis-
tinctive about performance indicators and audits today is
the scale of their diffusion and the extraordinary extent to
which society has embraced and endorsed them (Strathern
2000a). As Michael Power (1994) observed, “we have lost the
ability to be publicly skeptical about the fashion for audit
and quality assurance” (41) to the extent that they have come
to appear as natural and benign solutions to the problems of
performance, management, and governance. Power’s analysis
suggests that audits and indicators may be part of the prob-
lem rather than the solution: their aim may be organizational
transparency, but they end up being opaque; indicators be-
come targets as institutions are reshaped according to the
criteria and methods used to measure them; and organi-
zations and people are transformed into “auditable” entities
that focus their energies on doing “what counts.” How did
this situation arise, and where did these calculative tech-
nologies for measuring and enhancing performance stem
from? Signiﬁcantly, universities and academies were them-
selves early pioneers in turning complex social processes into
numbers.
Ranking: From Education and the Military
to the Corporation and Back
In 1817, the new principal of the West Point Military Acad-
emy, Sylvanus Thayer, instituted an educational system,
which he borrowed from the École Polytechnique in France,
based on arithmetic grading. Thayer established a hierarchi-
cal structure at the Academy, down which rules and regula-
tions passed to the students and up which ﬂowed regular and
systematized reports including students’ grades. The authors
of this study explain: “This is a total accountability system,
where all aspects of performance, academic and behavioural,
are constantly measured, evaluated and recorded in a joint
numerical-linguistic language which is also a currency” (Hos-
kin andMacve 1988:49).
According to Hoskin and Macve, every student’s subject
knowledge was tested daily, weekly, and half-yearly and
marked according to a standardized, seven-point numerical
scale. Students’ aptitude, study habits, and whether their con-
duct was sufﬁciently “military” were also recorded in weekly,
monthly, and half-yearly reports and given a grade on a
seven-point descriptive scale from “excellent” to “indiffer-
ent.” Both sets of reports went up the hierarchy. The marks
were used to divide each year into four graded classes. Each
student knew his place and what he had to do to move up the
ranking. This was “an exhaustive hierarchical reﬂexive system
of command and communication, . . . which (ideally) made
every individual in the institution constantly visible and ac-
countable for his behaviour” (Hoskin and Macve 1988:59).
The West Point students were made into calculative, self-
disciplined selves. They learned the norms against which they
were marked, and they knew what they had to do to improve
their grades. Their ﬁnal mark determined how prestigious
their ﬁrst appointment would be, and their record accompa-
nied them throughout their military career and beyond.
This system produced the best civil engineers in the
country. It also produced some of the best managers of the
armories, the railroads, and the newly forming industrial
corporations. They imported into these organizations a hi-
erarchy down which passed meticulous regulations and up
which passed written reports with number-based, normal-
izing judgments. These reports graded each employee’s pro-
Shore and Wright Audit Culture Revisited 423
This content downloaded from 158.223.166.062 on February 15, 2019 04:29:49 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ductivity and were the currency for comparing units, so that
every employee “felt and often remarked that the eyes of the
company were always on them through the books” (Chan-
dler 1997:267–268, quoted in Hoskin and Macve 1988:67).
In short, the organization of corporate America relied heavily
on the West Point graduates’ reﬂexive knowledge about
how to create a system of organization and discipline that
turned managers and workers into calculative, accountable
selves.
This method of accounting was further reﬁned by Fred-
erick Taylor’s (1913) scientiﬁc management, which analyzed
work ﬂows in order to improve labor productivity. Taylor’s
ideas were inﬂuential in the organization of domestic in-
dustries during the First World War and were taken up in
the 1920s as part of the Scientiﬁc Management Movement.
Although Taylor visited Henry Ford’s automobile factory in
Michigan shortly before he died in 1915, Ford was devel-
oping his own principles of modern mass production and
automation that paralleled Taylorism. Initially, Ford’s suc-
cess derived from dividing the car manufacturing process
into standardized small elements, then costing and measur-
ing every aspect of production to achieve efﬁciencies while
carefully maintaining oversight of the assembly line’s co-
herence and ﬂow. But fragmenting the production process
also had negative consequences. During the 1940s, Henry
Ford II employed 10 “whiz kids” from the army air force’s
statistical team to create further productive efﬁciencies. One
of these, Robert McNamara, became president of the Ford
Motor Company in the 1950s. As president, he used the new
IBM computers to feed numbers into spreadsheets to turn
what had been a family company into “an omniscient op-
erating system,” albeit one that, he later admitted, “I would
go out of my way to discourage my son from working in”
(Starkey and McKinlay 1994:980, quoted in Martin 2010:16).
The manager of each section was given targets, and their
performance was measured by a higher bureaucracy. This
created a task-driven, ﬁercely competitive culture, in which
each section competed with every other and managers gamed
the system to advance their own institutional position. This
system became counterproductive and dysfunctional when
concern for internal competition and intrigue far outweighed
any overall vision of the quality of the car or the satisfaction
of the customer. Situations arose in which, as one manager
confessed, supervisors were only concerned with “meeting
output targets . . . even if it meant subverting Ford’s quality
control systems” (Martin 2010:16–17). As Tom Peters, co-
author of the famous management book In Search of Ex-
cellence (Peters andWaterman 1982), complained, “Start with
Taylorism, add . . . a dose of McNamaraism, and by the late
1970s you had the great American corporation that was being
run bybean counters” (Peters 2001:88, cited inMartin 2010:18).
When he was appointed US secretary of defense under
President Kennedy, McNamara transferred this system to
the running of the Vietnam War. But he later admitted that,
apart from counting body bags, there was very little numer-
ical data available on which to conduct the war, and reliance
on number crunching proved a disastrous substitute for “our
profound ignorance of the history, culture and politics [of
Vietnam]” (McNamara, quoted in Martin 2010:16).
If McNamara’s handling of the Vietnam War is an in-
ternational example of the immorality of governing by num-
bers, another example from the automobile industry high-
lights the “banality of evil” that may result from the marriage
of cost accounting with the single-minded pursuit of proﬁt
that is the driving force and legal mandate behind the mod-
ern corporation. Joel Bakan (2005) describes the story of the
liability case Anderson v. General Motors Corporation, where
the jury awarded Patricia Anderson a $4.9 billion verdict.
On Christmas Day 1993, Anderson, her four children, and
a family friend were driving home from Christmas Mass
when the back of her car, a Chevrolet Malibu, was struck by
a drunk driver. The Malibu’s gas tank exploded on impact.
The adults were able to escape, but the four children were
trapped in the backseat and suffered terrible second- and
third-degree burns. The plaintiffs ﬁled their lawsuit on the
grounds that the fuel tank was dangerously positioned, just
11 inches from the back bumper, to save costs, with no metal
brace to separate the fuel tank from the rear of the car. A
company directive had recommended that fuel tanks be at
least 17 inches from the rear bumper, and during the trial
the plaintiffs’ lawyers obtained GM internal memos that the
company had blocked in previous lawsuits. These revealed a
damning 1973 report, written by GM engineer Edward Ivey,
which concluded that it would be cheaper to maintain the
current fuel tank than design a tank that did not explode in
a crash. Ivey’s report estimated that there would be 500 fa-
talities related to accidents with fuel-fed ﬁres and that each
fatality would cost $200,000 in compensation. He then calcu-
lated that since there were 41 million General Motors auto-
mobiles on the road, the cost per car to GM would be $2.40.
On the other hand, the cost of designing a nonexploding fuel
tank would be $8.59 per car. Hence, the company stood to
“save $6.19 . . . per automobile if it allowed people to die in
fuel-fed ﬁres rather than alter the design” (Bakan 2005:63).
Although it is not clear whether anyone in senior manage-
ment had seen Ivey’s report, the judge described GM’s be-
havior as “morally reprehensible and against applicable laws
because it had put proﬁts above public safety” (Bakan 2005:
63). The court awarded Armstrong and her children com-
pensatory damages of $107 million and unprecedented pu-
nitive damages of $4.9 billion. A Los Angeles Superior Court
later reduced this to $1.09 billion. Even so, the US Cham-
ber of Commerce called this an “illegitimate result” on the
grounds that manufacturers’ use of cost-beneﬁt analyses in
the design of products is “a hallmark of corporate good be-
havior” and the “logic underlying it is unimpeachable” (Bakan
2005:64).
Regardless of these failures in both industry and the mil-
itary, the idea of ﬁnancializing the operations and perfor-
mance of complex organizations and turning their activities
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into numbers was transposed to the public sector in the
1980s as a core feature of “new public management.” As we
have documented elsewhere (Shore and Wright 1999, 2000),
the work of schools, hospitals, municipal government, pro-
vision for the elderly, and most other public services was
reduced to numerical score sheets and ranked in competitive
league tables. These new regimes of accountability were jus-
tiﬁed in the name of efﬁciency and transparency. The per-
formance of players at the top of the league were distilled
and decontextualized as “best practice” to be spread to the
others, notably those “named and shamed” at the bottom of
the league. Key performance indicators (KPIs) were devised
as measures of the quality, efﬁciency, and value for money of
virtually all public services. Typically, performance was ex-
pressed in ﬁnancial ﬁgures, and while claims were made that
these numerical indicators were only proxies for quality or
effectiveness, in reality, monetary value became the domi-
nant measure. In this way, quantiﬁcation and scientiﬁc man-
agement were married to a project of ﬁnancialization and a
new ethics of accountability.
A new period in the evolution of this system of governing
through numbers was its reintroduction into universities.
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand were early pioneers in
the 1980s (Wright et al. 2014). First, Britain developed a
national evaluation of university research called the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE). The research output of each de-
partment was read by a committee of peers from the relevant
discipline and, reminiscent of the West Point system, was
graded on a seven-point marking scale. While initially each
institution received a standardized amount of funding per
researcher, in the course of successive RAEs, governments
used these grades to concentrate funding on those at the top
of the league table and to progressively withdraw funding
from those at the bottom. By 2001, 75% of research resources
were concentrated on the top tier of departments. This
method of “rewarding success” and “punishing failure” en-
sured that those universities lower down the scale were de-
nied the resources that might enable them to pull themselves
up. The same punitive model was applied to the national
school system, with similar effects. Such systems of grading
and ranking have “skewing effects” (Wright 2009), as aca-
demics also know from the literature on “teaching to the
test” and the “washback effect” of any examination system
(Cheng, Watanabe, and Curtis 2004). The skewing effects of
systems of measuring and grading universities’ research out-
put are now so familiar that they have acquired their own
terminology, such as “salami slicing” (cutting research results
into small chunks, each published as a separate journal article),
“rushing to press” (publishing partial results as soon as they
are available rather than making a mature and considered
analysis), and the “star player” syndrome (hiring high-proﬁle
researchers just before a research assessment exercise; Shore
and McLauchlan 2012:282; Wright 2009). The UK House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee (2004) called
the RAE a “morass of ﬁddling, ﬁnagling and horse trading”
that was “starting to lack credibility” (21). Similarly, a British
Academy Policy Centre report warned of the perverse effects
of using aggregated measures and rankings punitively to name
and shame rather than developmentally to internally diagnose
and remedy problems (Foley and Goldstein 2012).
With the multiple borrowings of these ranking systems—
from the French École Polytechnique to West Point Acad-
emy to the management of private corporations and from
there to the public sector, including universities—important
shifts occurred both in the assessment technologies and their
effects (Wright 2012). These “omniscient operating systems”
became ever more “individualizing and totalizing” (Foucault
1977) in that they simultaneously worked across scales to or-
der a whole population or sector while also rendering mili-
tary cadets, factory workers, and university students as cal-
culating and “calculable” subjects. At the same time, these
ranking technologies also radically reshaped institutions in
their own image, for as is well known, when a feature of an or-
ganization is measured, that measure becomes a target. This
is often referred to as Goodhart’s Law, after the advisor who
warned Britain’s Conservative government in the 1970s against
trying to conduct monetary policy on the basis of targets
(Goodhart 1981). A recent illustration of this tendency to turn
measures into targets was the aborted Australian system for
grading the quality of research publications according to
ranked lists of journals. At the last minute, the then minister
for higher education canceled the system following evidence
that university research managers were setting academics tar-
gets for publications in top-ranked journals. He condemned
this conversion of the measure into a target as “ill-informed
and undesirable behavior in the management of research”
(Carr 2011; Wright 2012). Michael Power (1997) has noted
that audit procedures “transform the environments to which
they are applied,” effectively colonizing and “permeating the
auditee organization totally” (90, 97). The effect is that or-
ganizations reshape their operations and values around that
which is measured. Equally importantly, individuals are in-
terpellated as “auditees,” whose behavior is expected to align
with the rationality of audit (Power 2007:335).
The examples above highlight wider theoretical points that,
building on Merry (2011), we call “audit effects.” We identify
ﬁve of these that are of particular importance: “domaining ef-
fects,” “classiﬁcatory effects,” “individualizing and totalizing
effects,” “governance effects,” and “perverse effects.” We elab-
orate brieﬂy on each of these in turn.
Domaining effects illustrate how the introduction of au-
dit and ranking into a new organizational context radically
reshapes that environment in ways that mirror the values
and priorities embedded within the audit technologies them-
selves. The application of audit to environments for which
it was never originally designed can produce a “runaway ef-
fect” as the newly created systems and modes of operating
gather their own momentum, as illustrated above where Mc-
Namara’s competitive accounting model at Ford spiraled out
of control.
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Classiﬁcatory effects highlight the fact that indicators and
statistics are never neutral. Just as other systems of mea-
surement do, an audit produces knowledge by “announcing
what it measures, such as ‘rule of law’ or ‘poverty’ ” (Merry
2011:S84) and hailing into existence the subjects that it cat-
egorizes and labels. The way that institutional systems clas-
sify and order populations has been amply documented by
Foucault (1980) and others. However, audit changes the val-
ues, priorities, and practices of organizational subjects in sub-
tle and often unnoticed ways such that their subject posi-
tions are transformed. This is what Ian Hacking (2004) has
elsewhere termed “dynamic nominalism” or the “looping ef-
fect.” Hacking (2006) elsewhere exempliﬁes this with refer-
ence to the invention of medical categories such as “multiple
personality disorder,” “IQ,” and “obesity,” but it is equally
evident in the classiﬁcation of “failing schools,” “lowest-
ranking cadet” (e.g., the “West Point goat”), and Fortune’s
“most admired” human resources department.
The way these classiﬁcations and rankings tend to simul-
taneously order both whole populations and individuals is
captured by the individualizing and totalizing effects. Key
to the success of this process is the neat, simple, and efﬁ-
cient way in which it achieves its effectiveness—at minimal
cost and effort to the organization. For example, when the
international standing of universities is turned into a perfor-
mance indicator and that indicator is used to allocate fund-
ing, this simple mechanism has effects across three scales:
the whole sector is reorganized in pursuit of competitive
advantage, each organization is repurposed around the tar-
gets and incentives, and every individual is impelled to con-
centrate on “what counts” (Wright 2014). It was to avoid such
a pervasive effect that Australia’s higher education minister
intervened to cancel the Excellence in Research for Australia
initiative. However, US law school deans have been unable
to contest their version of individualizing and totalizing ef-
fects as their ranking determines their position in the mar-
ket and ability to attract income from student fees (Sauder
and Espeland 2009). Governance through numbers, as these
examples show, creates ranking regimes that operate across
multiple scales, producing a “total accountability system”
(Hoskin and Macve 1988).
Governance effects are a corollary of these individualizing
and totalizing mechanisms. Setting performance indicators
and assessing against benchmarks and best practice are in-
struments designed to make organizations more “accountable”
to funders, government, stakeholders, consumers, and the pub-
lic. While they render individuals and organizations more
“legible” to external experts, there is a coercive dimension to
that accountability: organizations must represent themselves
in terms of the narrow, predetermined script of expert as-
sessors, in what Strathern (2000b) calls the “tyranny of trans-
parency.” These ways of opening up organizations for scru-
tiny and inspection also provide a vehicle for enacting and
extending the presence of the state, or what Mitchell (1999)
has termed the “state effect” (see also Trouillot 2001).
Finally, perverse effects draw attention to the ways in
which governing by numbers, when taken to extremes or
misapplied—such as in the Vietnam War—fails to deliver
what it promises and, whether one counts beans or bodies,
may result in decision making that is amoral or outcomes
that are immoral. One dimension of this is the increasing
stress and anxiety that rankings produce among individuals
who are driven to overperform (King and Moutsou 2010;
Wright 2011). As a BBC “Panorama” investigation into the
employment conditions at one of Amazon’s UK warehouses
found, intensiﬁed time-and-motion techniques have been
taken to new levels. Amazon gives its “pickers” handsets that
tell them what to collect from the shelves. It allots 33 seconds
to ﬁnd a product, and then a timer counts down until the next
product is retrieved. A manager oversees this electronic data
ﬂow to ensure that all the pickers keep up to speed throughout
10-and-a-half-hour shifts that involve up to 11 miles of walk-
ing. Professor Michael Marmot, a leading expert on stress at
work, argues that these conditions greatly increase the risk of
mental and physical illness (BBC News 2013). This is the kind
of omniscient operating system McNamara sought to achieve,
and the “efﬁciencies” it delivers are ones to which many other
corporations aspire.
A New Industry of Measuring and Ranking
The rise of systems of auditing and ranking has been ac-
companied and fueled by the growth of international ﬁrms
specializing in accountancy and statistical ratings. These in-
clude, at one extreme, the various credit rating agencies that
have now consolidated into the Big Three ﬁrms of Moody’s,
Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. These agencies measure the
creditworthiness of countries and organizations (including
universities), and their letter grades, ranging from AAA to D,
communicate the agencies’ view of the level of credit risk.
These opinions affect the rates of interest at which a coun-
try can borrow money, sometimes with seriously deleterious
consequences, as, for example, in February 2012, when Fitch
downgraded Greece from CCC to C, or “junk” status, thereby
massively increasingly the country’s already unsustainable
level of national debt (Paphitis 2012). At a more microlevel,
credit reference agencies and bureaus with Dickensian names
such as Paydex, Experian Intelliscore, Dunn and Bradstree,
Equifax, and Call-Credit score the creditworthiness of indi-
viduals to determine a person’s eligibility for a mortgage, per-
sonal loan, or credit card.
In the ﬁeld of international accounting, four large com-
mercial ﬁrms dominate the market: Deloitte, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, Ernst and Young, and KPMG. Signiﬁcantly, in 2011–
2012, a period of continuing ﬁnancial crisis in Europe and the
United States, the revenues of these companies grew by an
astonishing 6%, netting a record $110 billion, thanks to their
expansion into emerging economies (Big4 2013). Each of
these ﬁrms now operates in more than 140 countries and
employs a professional staff of between 140,000 and 200,000
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people. The largest of them, Deloitte, represents itself as “the
brand under which nearly 200,000 professionals in indepen-
dent ﬁrms throughout the world collaborate to provide au-
dit, consulting, ﬁnancial advisory, risk management, and tax
services to selected clients” (Deloitte 2013a).
The Big Four owe their global success in large measure
to the privatization policies of the 1980s and 1990s, when
neoliberal-inspired governments outsourced and privatized
state services but required them to be audited by a commer-
cial accounting ﬁrm. In the early 2000s in the United Kingdom
alone, more than 600,000 limited companies, plus schools,
hospitals, charities, local authorities, pension funds, and trade
unions, were required by law to undertake annual ﬁnancial
audits conducted by professional accounting ﬁrms. The Big
Four gained the largest share of this work. However, another
key development during the 1990s was the expansion of the
remit of these accounting ﬁrms and their shift from ﬁnancial
accounting into other professional domains.
Promotional material produced by the Big Four illustrates
just how far their business has extended beyond ﬁnancial ac-
counting. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) now offers services
and expertise in 22 industry sectors that range from aerospace
and defense, asset management, and capital projects and ex-
penditure to entertainment and media, government/public
services, health care, pharmaceuticals, and life sciences. PwC
even offers services in anticorruption and whistle-blowing.
These global accounting ﬁrms often sell their services on the
basis of being “integrity warriors,” whose mission is to en-
sure ﬁnancial probity and “good governance,” but their own
ﬁnancial practices are anything but best practice. As Cousins,
Mitchell, and Sikka (2004) point out, all four “are head-
quartered in secretive tax havens without information shar-
ing treaties with other countries” (4). Each of the Big Four
has been criticized for its own illegal activities. A study by
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the United
Kingdom estimated that the Big Four “were behind almost
half of all known [tax] avoidance schemes” (Sikka 2012), al-
though, paradoxically, HMRC has itself been criticized by the
British House of Commons Public Accounts Committee for
its cozy relationship with the Big Four (Sikka 2011). Investi-
gations by the House of Commons Public Accounts Commit-
tee have put some of their predatory practices on the public
record. KPMG was ﬁned $456 million (£284 million) for fa-
cilitating tax evasion, and some of its former personnel were
sent to prison. Ernst and Young devised a scheme for the Iliffe
News and Media group to turn their proﬁts into royalties and
then claim tax relief on those royalty payments. The com-
pany board’s minutes stated that Ernst and Young, who also
audited the company’s ﬁnancial accounts, conﬁrmed that
the use of this scheme would “signiﬁcantly lessen the trans-
parency of reported results” (Sikka 2012). KPMG has also
been in trouble for cold-calling companies to offer them tax-
avoidance schemes. One scheme enabled a company with
127 amusement arcades in the United Kingdom to avoid pay-
ing value-added tax (VAT). It improved the company’s prof-
its by £4.2 million, and KPMG charged its client £75,000 and
a fee of 25% of the avoided VAT in the ﬁrst year, 15% in the
second year, and 5% thereafter (Sikka 2012). Even though
KPMG knew the UK tax authorities would regard the scheme
as “unacceptable tax avoidance,” when they lost their case in
the UK’s High Court, they pursued it in the European Court
of Justice, which also declared the scheme unacceptable.
In 2012, PwC was also ﬁned (this time £1.4 million) for
7 years of false reporting to the UK’s Financial Services Au-
thority about J. P. Morgan, one of the banks it audited. PwC
was found to have not carried out its work “with due skill,
care and diligence and with proper regard for the applicable
technical and professional standards expected of it” (Pratley
2012). Taking up the mantra of turning risk into business
opportunity, another of the Big Four has recently launched
an online “anti-corruption and anti-fraud tool” called Deloitte
Diligence, which “helps organizations address regulatory and
reputational risk by streamlining the management of third-party
investigations and analysis” (Deloitte 2013b). “Diligence” in this
context not only means conducting due diligence on behalf of
clients but also carefully screening information to avoid the
“new risks” of adverse media and the attention of watchdog
and regulatory bodies.
The Big Four have expanded their operations not only
into new sectors but also into developing internal audits.
Whereas the traditional auditor’s role was to offer impartial
and detached scrutiny of an organization’s accounts, “inter-
nal audit” is a consulting activity based on detailed knowl-
edge of a sector and its market niches. By monitoring and
analyzing organizational risk and by “data harvesting,” it
aims to add value and improve an organization’s operations
while ensuring compliance with procedures and laws. For
example, Ernst and Young (2013) claims that its “clean tech-
nology” experts will make a “sustainability assessment” by
“look[ing] across your business to understand what will work
for you from carbon credits, green IT, to green real estate
transactions.” However, internal audit also entails “working
in partnership with management” to mitigate risks and en-
sure “that the organization’s corporate governance is strong
and effective” (Cornell University Audit Ofﬁce 2013). As Ernst
and Young (2012) advertise, “In addition to internal audit
knowledge, stakeholders expect internal auditors to have the
ability to team with management and business units on rele-
vant business issues. They also expect internal audit resources
to have deep sector knowledge and business acumen.”
The problem here is that there are bound to be conﬂicts of
interest where the same ﬁrm that provides an external, im-
partial audit is also “working in partnership” with the com-
pany’s senior management to improve its business perfor-
mance and is closely involved in its internal operations. For
example, in Denmark, PwC advises the Ministry of Educa-
tion and acts as external auditor for several universities,
where it is also consultant and “sparring partner” for the se-
nior management. In this case, PwC claims deep experience in
dealing with complex relationships. In other instances, such
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entanglements may help explain the growth in cases of tax
evasion and collusion between audit ﬁrms and companies.
During this period, other organizations have also emerged
to audit and rank speciﬁc sectors. The OECD is notable as
the international agency that produces Education at a Glance
and the PISA ranking of public education systems, which
governments take extremely seriously and use to shape their
policies. Some publishing ﬁrms have developed business plans
based on producing university rankings at national and global
scales, such as the Times Higher Education’s World Univer-
sity Ranking and the US News and World Report’s Best Col-
lege Guide. For QS university rankings, a second income
stream is generated by universities commissioning detailed
analyses of their performance and consultancy services on
how to improve it. Further companies provide citation data
for the ranking organizations, notably Thomson Reuters
(2013), which describes itself as “the world’s leading source
of intelligent information for businesses and professionals.”
The citation indexes focus on the leading journals in each
ﬁeld, which have been acquired by the larger publishing
companies. They extract proﬁt from “free” academic labor
(i.e., in writing, peer reviewing, and editing journal articles)
and then sell the products back to university libraries at high
cost (Ciancanelli 2007). The competitive game of universi-
ties struggling for “world class” status is thus a mechanism of
audit culture second to none, which provides new revenue
streams for the industries that have mushroomed from the
imperatives of measuring and ranking.
Why Managers and Governments Adopt
Auditing Technologies
University leaders today are confronted with a bewildering
array of measurements that rank different aspects of a uni-
versity, everything from its creditworthiness and success in
attracting competitive funding to its environmental sustain-
ability, its standing in the world, and its score for “student
experience.”Many of these numerical systems measure things
that academics do not regard as important to teaching and
research, and some academics have used their expertise to
show how these rankings are arbitrary, unreliable, and ﬂawed.
Given such critiques (Gladwell 2011), why do university lead-
ers accredit these rankings with such importance? This is an
empirical question that we address by drawing on three eth-
nographic examples.
Our ﬁrst case study shows why university leaders criticize
the rankings yet still treat them with a seriousness bordering
on obsession. Regardless of the measures used, six university
“global superbrands” top all global rankings and occupy “a
special zone beyond ordinary competition” (Baty 2012). The
grades in the middle ranks are then so similar to each other
that the slightest change in the deﬁnition or weighting of one
measure can move universities up and down the list quite
substantially. University leaders have to follow these changes
assiduously as they are aware that parents and students use
rankings as proxies for quality and status. When US News
and World Report began making an annual ranking of US
law schools, the dean at Yale called it an “idiot poll” and
Harvard’s dean described it as “Mickey Mouse, just plain
wacky and totally bonkers” (Sauder and Espeland 2009:68).
Despite this repudiation, all of the deans in Sauder and Es-
peland’s study of law schools admitted to devoting vast re-
sources to playing the ranking game. A “good dean” knows
in intimate detail how the variables in each of the rankings
are constructed and will check that they are registering all
the positive ﬁgures (about students, staff, income, publica-
tions, exam performance, graduate employment, etc.) in pre-
cisely the right way for the ranking companies to pick them
up in their questionnaires and surveys. The deans explained
that the rankings are “omnipresent”—that academic deci-
sions about the curriculum, evaluation of subordinates, fac-
ulty publication strategies, admissions policies, and budget
allocations are all shaped by their likely effect on the school’s
numbers and ranking. Whether making budget allocations
or keeping meticulous records of inconsequential details, ad-
ministrators resent the all-consuming attentiveness to the
presumed requirements of the for-proﬁt ranking companies.
But there are serious punishments for not doing so. If they
get it wrong, their school could slip down the scale, with dire
consequences for their ability to attract students, maintain
fee income, and hence sustain academic employment. The
rankings thus elicit an involuntary “reactivity” (Espeland and
Sauder 2007). The deans’ unwilling endorsement “makes
these shaky measures pervasive and generative of the orga-
nisation itself” (Sauder and Espeland 2009:68). This account
shows how such measurements are simultaneously individ-
ualizing and totalizing and illustrates their coerciveness—and
why they are so impervious to criticism.
Our second case concerns the attempts by the manage-
ment of the University of Auckland to transform the insti-
tution into a more “entrepreneurial university.” Whereas in
the previous case, the object of measurement was the de-
partment or school, in this case, the focus was on the indi-
vidual academic. The vice chancellor (as the “employer”)
sought to change unilaterally the criteria for academic stan-
dards and promotion in order to incentivize academics to
increase their outputs and engage in commercial and income-
generating activities. He replaced the traditional promotion
system, whereby peers assessed the teaching, research, and
service of colleagues and judged them using the qualitative
categories of “satisfactory,” “merit,” and “excellent.” In its
place, he employed a new “academic standards” policy based
on numerical measures and quantiﬁable output targets for
each grade, claiming that this would enable promotions to
be based on “transparent” and “objective” evidence of “sus-
tained performance.” The academic standard expected for
promotion to the rank of professor in a social science disci-
pline was now at least 50 publications in high-quality jour-
nals; research with “a demonstrable quality and impact”; no
less than six honors, six masters, and eight PhD students
supervised to completion; and “three major external grants,”
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each yielding in excess of $100,000 (UoA 2013:4). These
criteria discriminate heavily in favor of the STEM subjects
(science, technology, engineering, and medicine) and pre-
sent obstacles for New Zealand’s social scientists as there is
only one major source of fundamental research funding, the
Royal Society of New Zealand’s Marsden Fund, which awards
only 10–12 social science projects per year and has a success
rate of approximately 8%. As several academics were quick
to point out, by these standards, virtually none of New Zea-
land’s existing social science or humanities professors would
qualify for promotion to senior lecturer, let alone professor.
The task of quantifying these outputs for each candidate
falls to human resources (HR), whose personnel now plays a
greater role in the new promotions committees, exemplify-
ing the wider trend, noted earlier, of technocratic criteria over-
riding qualitative and professional judgments.
The employer argued that the promotion criteria needed
greater “clarity and transparency” because academics were
confused by the multiple potential meanings of terms like
“merit” and “satisfactory,” even though heads of department
and members of the university’s own stafﬁng committee said
they rarely experienced problems working with the old cri-
teria. When challenged about the alleged beneﬁts of these
new yardsticks, the employer claimed they were based on
best practice among Australia’s leading Group of Eight uni-
versities. Members of the university senate found that this
“benchmarking” exercise consisted of little more than a brief
e-mail exchange between the former director of HR and her
counterparts at these Australian universities. Many academ-
ics, led by their union, responded to the employer’s “consul-
tation process” by highlighting the numerous ﬂaws in the
new system of academic standards. In addition, they noted
that the process was being driven by the university’s cost-
cutting goals and its ambitious revenue targets in the “stra-
tegic plan.” It seems that the new quantiﬁed and ﬁnancialized
performance targets for promotion were being aligned with
the vice chancellor’s own key performance indicators. How-
ever, this speculation could not be conﬁrmed because in New
Zealand the key performance indicators that affect university
vice chancellors’ pay, like those of many company CEOs, are
treated as conﬁdential. This example highlights one of the
striking features of audit culture and how it achieves its gov-
ernance effects. Demands for transparency and accountability
are characteristically one-directional and top-down, as those
in positions of power seek to make legible the performance
of those below them without being accountable to those they
govern. In this case, however, the Tertiary Education Union
did manage to successfully contest the vice chancellor. They
took the case to mediation at the Employment Relations Au-
thority, which ruled that the employer had breached his
statutory obligations to involve academics in this area of
shared university governance (TEU 2013). When the vice
chancellor continued his efforts to impose his new academic
standards policy, the union took the case back to the Em-
ployment Relations Authority and won again (Shore and Da-
vidson 2014).
Whereas in the US example, rankings reshaped the or-
ganization of schools, and in the New Zealand case, mea-
sures aimed to reshape the conduct of individual academics,
in our third ethnographic example, from Denmark, one nu-
merical instrument was designed to act simultaneously on three
scales: those of the sector, the institution, and the individual.
The Danish government’s reforms of 2003 explicitly sought
to make universities the drivers of Denmark’s competitive-
ness in the global knowledge economy. New management
structures were implemented so that government could trust
universities to use an increased allocation of public funding
strategically to beneﬁt industry and “surrounding society.”
Money was to be allocated competitively between the uni-
versities, and this necessitated creating a new funding for-
mula that was initially to have three elements—teaching, re-
search, and knowledge exchange. The research element was
partly based on a “bibliometric points system” that required
all academics to enter their publications into a national
database each year. In 2007, 68 disciplinary committees involv-
ing 360 academics were set up to make an authorized list of
all journals and publishers in each discipline and to distin-
guish the top 20% “level 2” outlets. This work took 2 years to
complete, not least because the ministry attempted to ra-
tionalize the lists and 58 of the 68 chairs signed a petition
stating that the consolidated lists were not an appropriate
tool for allocating funding. The ministry withdrew its lists,
and the committees began their work again. The ministry
now uses the authorized lists each year to allocate numeri-
cal scores for each publication (e.g., three points for each
level 2 journal article and one for each “level 1” article). It
then calculates the overall scores for each individual, depart-
ment, and university. Despite the time-consuming complex-
ity of this method, the eventual funding formula gives only
a very small weighting to these bibliometric points. How-
ever, the attempt to create a metrics for “knowledge exchange
with surrounding society” collapsed. This has resulted in an
even heavier reliance on research scores than originally in-
tended. Whereas the government’s main aim was to make
universities more outward facing, it has ended up with a
system that privileges publications in elite academic journals
that have a notoriously small public readership. This com-
petitive funding formula has been very successful in differ-
entiating the sector with the aim of promoting the interna-
tional rankings of three of the eight universities. At the same
time, this formula has been used by university management
to make faculties and departments compete with each other
for funding and reorganize their institutions around a ﬁ-
nancial calculus and competitive ethos. This, in turn, has re-
shaped the subjectivities of some academics who now value
and narrate themselves in terms of how many points they
earn for their department. However, academics in some facul-
ties have organized successful collective opposition to what
many termed an “existential threat” to academic identity and
values (Wright 2014). These three empirical examples exem-
plify why governments and managers have so eagerly em-
braced audit culture: its techniques provide indispensable tools
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of contemporary management that are extremely effective
insofar as they align individuals, institutions, and whole sec-
tors within a space of governance.
Conclusion: Audits, Ranking,
and the (Re)ordering of Society
The institutionalized processes of measuring and ranking
described above and their spread into many domains of or-
ganizational and social life reveal the emergence of a new
type of governmentality based on a ﬁnancial calculus—an in-
strumental, results- and target-driven normative order that
governs by numbers and, more importantly, through num-
bers. While not conﬁned to neoliberal polities, the charac-
teristics of this new order include all of neoliberalism’s key
ingredients—including “governing at a distance”; a relentless
pursuit of economic efﬁciency; deregulation, outsourcing,
and privatization; marketization and the privileging of com-
petition over cooperation; increasing separation between an
empowered managerial elite and a deprofessionalized work-
force; the objectiﬁcation of human labor—combined with in-
creasing emphasis on calculative practices aimed at promot-
ing individualization and responsibilization. In this way, the
political technologies of ﬁnancial cost accounting wedded
to the project of management have been highly effective in
producing accountable and transparent subjects that are si-
multaneously docile yet self-managed.
Our study shows the diversity of forms that audit culture
can take in different settings but also the similarities of its
effects. Its governance effect is seen most notably in the ex-
ample from New Zealand, where the logic and instruments
of ﬁnancial accounting were used to incentivize academic
performance. Measurement and rankings serve a variety of po-
litical purposes. First, they appear to provide a more rational
way of controlling institutions through new conﬁgurations of
knowledge and power. Second, they are extremely effective at
opening up for external scrutiny the inner worlds of organi-
zations, and they render commensurable and controllable all
kinds of disparate individuals, institutions, and objects with
diverse and incommensurate features. Third, numbers exert
a curiously seductive power (Porter 1996). Indicators are as-
sumed to be objective and unambiguous because of their as-
sociation with science and the “pure and constant rules of
mathematics” (Merry 2011:S90). As Strathern (2000a) puts
it, “an aura has come to surround numbers, and despite the
caveats of professional auditors, it is those unfamiliar with
ﬁnancial auditing who tend to sanctify them” (8). Signiﬁ-
cantly, the people who are enamored by numerical rankings
“tend to be those most distant from their production” (Sauder
and Espeland 2009:72).
The introduction of audit and accounting changes the
nature of the organizations so that their activities become
increasingly focused on the measures by which their per-
formance is judged. Indeed, this belief that organizational
behavior can be engineered and improved through targets
and elaborate procedures of internal audit is central to the
advertising claims of the Big Four accountancy ﬁrms. They
see this domaining effect as a positive outcome that delivers
efﬁciency, commensurability, and accountability, but critics
might ask for whom and to whom. The study by Sauder and
Espeland shows the powerful domaining effect of numerical
measures as they provide transposable templates for mana-
gerial control and make possible new forms of remote sur-
veillance: “They are abstract, concise, easily portable; because
they decontextualize so thoroughly they travel widely and
are easy to insert into new places and for new uses” (Sauder
and Espeland 2009:71).
These regimes of audit also create the categories into
which people are invited to rethink themselves. This classi-
ﬁcatory effect is viewed as delivering positive outcomes by
those who sell and operate these systems, but again critics
might point to the other outcomes (individualizing and to-
talizing, governance, and perverse effects) and draw differ-
ent conclusions. All three case studies show the classiﬁcatory
effects of rankings and the way they shift power away from
professionals and onto managers and administrators. The
use of numerical performance indicators has been highly in-
strumental in distinguishing a new class of technocrats (man-
agers, accountants, administrators, HR ofﬁcers, executive lead-
ers). They are tasked with controlling the organization and
ensuring that it meets its targets, and they are separated from
the professionals and workers who deliver the services and
create value in the organization. Quantitative indicators pro-
vide hard evidence for the claim that managers are improv-
ing quality or achieving measurable yardsticks of progress.
When professionals contend that these regimes of account-
ability have perverse effects and do not improve quality—or
may even damage their institutions and services—they are
often cut out of the conversation between the policy makers
and the public. Indeed, according to “agency theory,” pro-
fessionals must be excluded from direct involvement in the
management of an organization to protect it from “institu-
tional capture” (Olssen and Peters 2005).
Our examples suggest that audit culture and its effects
are having a number of negative consequences. Building on
Power (2007:333–334), the following can be highlighted:
1. loss of organizational trust (O’Neill 2002; Power 1994);
2. elaborate and wasteful gaming strategies (House of Com-
mons 2004; Shore and Wright 2000; Wright 2009);
3. a culture of compliance and large compliance costs,
including the appointment of new specialists preoccupied
with creating positive (mis)representations of performance
(Miller 2001);
4. defensive strategies and blamism that stiﬂe innovation and
focus on short-term objectives over long-term needs (Hood
2002);
5. deprofessionalization, a disconnect between motivation
and incentives, lower employee morale, and increased stress
and anxiety (Bovbjerg 2011; Brenneis, Shore, and Wright 2005;
Wright 2014);
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6. “tunnel vision” and performing to the measure, with a
focus solely on what is counted, to the exclusion of anything
else (Townley and Doyle 2007);
7. and the undermining of welfare and educational activities
that cannot be easily measured (King and Moutsou 2010).
Given these combined effects, it seems imperative to ﬁnd
ways to reclaim the space for academic professionalism that
is placed at risk by the spread of audit culture. Evidence from
New Zealand and Denmark shows that some people are de-
veloping strategies for resistance. Sauder and Espeland (2009)
explain how selective reporting on performance and control
over the representation and legibility of activities is used to
preserve space for the exercise of academic professional val-
ues. They call these tactics “buffering,” but such strategies also
carry risks of organizational schizophrenia (Shore and Wright
1999). Another potential strategy is to take back control over
the measures used to evaluate professional performance by
creating alternative experts and systems of evaluation and in-
sisting that organizations be evaluated in their own terms.
Again, the risk here is one of co-optation of professional val-
ues and their conversion into managerial indicators and in-
struments. After all, accountability, responsibility, quality,
self-management, and transparency are all values that pro-
fessionals would normally espouse. This is another reason
why it is so difﬁcult to criticize or challenge audit, as it often
hinges on a redeﬁnition of the words and ideas that auditees
themselves hold dear (Shore 2008; Wright 2005). A further
strategy would be to accept that numerical indicators are here
to stay but to change the focus of what counts. Instead of
efﬁciency, economy, and outputs, one could develop other
measures of success, for example, well-being, happiness, and
quality of life rather than GDP, as argued in the recently pub-
lished report by Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009). However,
given the individualizing and totalizing nature of govern-
ing by numbers, as the New Zealand and Danish case stud-
ies show, the most successful antidote probably lies in col-
lective action and a reassertion of academic and professional
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This essay provides a very useful overview of the develop-
ment and international dissemination of audit culture. Cris
Shore and Susan Wright outline the incubation of this re-
gime of accountability in educational institutions, its export
to industrial and military contexts, and then its reincorpor-
ation back into the public sector, including universities. Uni-
versities, therefore, provide a particularly interesting vantage
point from which to observe the proliferation, persistence of,
and potential resistance to audit culture since they have been
so thoroughly implicated in its creation and proliferation.
As Shore and Wright demonstrate, this proliferation has
occurred in spite of the repeated failures of this regime of
accountability to actually deliver on its promised efﬁciencies
and transparencies. Nor does it appear that its proliferation
has been much impeded by critiques that have drawn atten-
tion to the limitations of auditing measures. In other words,
the dissemination of audit culture has drawn on assertions
of high standards of rigor and documentation that have ap-
peared impervious to evidence of shortfalls in these claims.
This imperviousness to refutation is of particular rele-
vance to one of the four sets of questions posed by Shore
and Wright: “Is audit an unstoppable ‘glass cage’ of coercive
transparency?” This article trains attention on the domain-
ing effect of audit culture, in which organizations are trans-
formed to mirror the logic of these technologies. The more
thorough this transformation, the harder it may be for or-
ganizations to separate themselves from the rationality of
this form of governance. But as Shore and Wright have also
noted, the dissemination of audit culture has been neither
“monolithic [n]or uniform,” in turn raising questions around
both the unevenness of the spread of audit culture as well
as the variability of resistance to its various instantiations.
The three cases examined by Shore and Wright offer some
potentially telling insights into the elements that are more
likely to elicit resistance to the imposition of audit culture.
Among these three cases, it was the effort by the vice chan-
cellor of the University of Auckland to change the basis of
evaluation for promotion to full professor that appears to
have drawn the most united and effective resistance. As op-
posed to the qualitative categories that had been used in judg-
ing eligibility for promotion, the vice chancellor now sought
to introduce numerical measures that were so onerous that
they would have excluded virtually all of the existing profes-
sors in the social sciences and the humanities. Supported
by many of its members, the Tertiary Education Union was
able to successfully contest this measure. It is not difﬁcult
to see why there was so much concerted opposition to this
among faculty members. After all, there would be few faculty
members who stood to gain from these new measures, espe-
cially among the social sciences and the humanities. Those
employees who could meet these new numerical standards
would have been equally successful in the old qualitative sys-
tem of evaluation. There were, therefore, few employees, if
any, who stood to improve their standing through this new
ranking system and a great many (a majority in non-STEM
disciplines) who stood to lose from the introduction of these
measures.
Audit culture is based on a zero-sum game: to succeed in
this game, someone has to lose. This is the basis of the most
corrosive effects of this form of governance, one that lies at
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the heart of the intense and dysfunctional competition that
Robert McNamara oversaw at the Ford Motor Company
during the 1950s. But, however dysfunctional, this system
seems most likely to gain compliance when at least some of
the people being subjected to it think they might have the
chance of improving their standing under new auditing mea-
sures, while others think that if they do not comply, their
standing might suffer. It is this kind of interpretation applied
to global rankings of universities that seems to underlie the
compliance of law school deans in another case examined by
Shore and Wright. Tellingly, in spite of the denunciations of
these rankings by the deans of the Harvard and Yale law
schools cited in this article, it is the institutions in the middle
rather than the top ranks that are most likely to be affected
by even slight changes in indicators.
As long as a signiﬁcant number of individuals or organi-
zations believe that they might be able to improve, or at least
protect, their standing by complying with the indicators
adopted in an auditing regime, there is less likely to be much
resistance and even less likely to be a united—and, hence,
effective—opposition to its installation. Ironically, what may
be most likely to convince more actors that it is not worth
trying to accommodate to the rules of these regimes is the
kind of administrative overreach that characterized the effort
to change the standards of promotion at the University of
Auckland.
Judy Brown
Professor of Accounting, School of Accounting and Commercial
Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
(judy.brown@vuw.ac.nz). 2 I 15
Problematizing Audit Culture
As an academic accountant with a long-standing interest in
the politics of accounting, I welcome Shore and Wright’s
critical analysis of audit culture. Given space limitations, I will
focus here on (i) the logics underpinning accounting practices
and their links with neoliberal politics and (ii) possibilities for
developing accountings based on alternative logics.
As the authors emphasize, accounting is not the apoliti-
cal, neutral technology it is often portrayed to be. In stark
contrast to the image of accounting as “harmless bookkeep-
ing” in popular culture, accounting plays a signiﬁcant role in
(re)producing social realities through the governmentalities
it helps to operationalize and the selected visibility it lends to
organizational activities. Through the ideas and actions they
help to normalize, accounting technologies impact the cul-
ture and priorities of governments, societies, and organiza-
tions in subtle and not-so-subtle ways.
Accounting has played a major part in enacting neoliberal
political agendas. Accountants helped introduce neoliberal
logics—based on competition, individualism, ﬁnancialization,
managerialism, and instrumental rationality—into the public
sector as a core aspect of new public management reforms in
the 1980s. In the corporate sector, the rise of neoliberalism
has seen an intensiﬁed focus on shareholder wealth maximi-
zation, with social and environmental accountings limited to
those for which a “business case” can be made. In the name of
good governance, international funding agencies such as the
World Bank have imposed neoliberal reforms on develop-
ing countries. In these various contexts, accountability and
transparency have been conceptualized in market-like terms,
with the negative impacts of neoliberalism and audit regimes
(e.g., work intensiﬁcation, growing inequalities, antidemo-
cratic practices) treated as externalities outside accounting’s
scope.
Neoliberal reforms have been portrayed by their advo-
cates as not only beneﬁcial but as though there were no
alternatives.As neoliberal logic has become increasingly sedi-
mented (e.g., within governance structures, in actors’ self-
understandings, through business school education), it is
perhaps unsurprising that many people cannot see how things
could be different, re(order) themselves, and/or feel powerless
to resist change. People also understandably hesitate to look
as though they are against accountability, efﬁciency, and good
governance, albeit that the real issue is arguably the need to
contest the meanings ascribed to these concepts under neo-
liberalism and the related marginalization of other values (e.g.,
social justice, democratic participation, ecological sustainabil-
ity).
So how should those dissatisﬁed with audit culture re-
spond? How might the neoliberal logics embedded in ac-
counting technologies be challenged most effectively? While
fully supporting Shore and Wright’s closing call for collec-
tive action, I would argue this needs to go well beyond “a
reassertion of academic and professional values.” In the case
of accounting and economics, mainstream academic and
professional values (e.g., the privileging of proﬁt maximiza-
tion, efﬁciency, economic growth, positivism) are a major
part of the problem. Similarly, the idea of “insisting that or-
ganizations be evaluated in their own terms” is problematic.
Mainstream accountants argue that they are doing that in
appraising corporate performance in terms of shareholder
wealth maximization, giving them license to ignore those who
seek to challenge shareholder primacy norms (e.g., in cor-
porate law) and highlight their negative impacts on others.
Relatedly, under the inﬂuence of neoliberalism, many actors
increasingly view universities instrumentally as corporate-
like entities that should serve business and the economy.
In line with contemporary scholarship on decentered gov-
ernance in political theory and critical policy studies (Griggs,
Norval, and Wagenaar 2014), another approach to contest-
ing audit culture would be to develop “the counter-logics of a
plural and democratic community” (Glynos and Howarth
2007:199) so that neoliberal logics and business rationalities
can be made more visible and counterposed (e.g., by high-
lighting competing discourses and their implications). A use-
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ful way of thinking about this—which also draws on the in-
sights of Foucault—is in terms of Tully’s (2008) calls for
public philosophy in a new key, through critical engagement
with a multiplicity of governance practices and associated
practices of freedom.
Here I draw attention to accounting research aimed at
developing pluralistic accountings that enable contestation
of neoliberal logics and forms of accountability that privilege
ﬁnance capital (Brown 2009; Brown and Dillard 2013, 2014,
forthcoming; Cooper and Morgan 2013; Gray, Brennan, and
Malpas 2014). This literature—with its roots in social and
critical accounting scholarship dating back to the 1970s—
aims to encourage critique of conventional accounting prac-
tices and the values, assumptions, and politics underpinning
them, as well as to open up possibilities for alternative ac-
countings/accountabilities that foster socially just and eco-
logically sustainable societies.
One set of proposals is for critical dialogic accountings—
codeveloped by alliances of cross-disciplinary academics and
civil society groups—aimed at enabling dialogue and debate
concerning what is accounted for, how it is accounted for,
and on whose terms (see Brown and Dillard, forthcoming,
for discussion in a policy context). The aspiration, in line
with that of heterodox economics (Söderbaum and Brown
2010), is to develop ideologically open accountings that con-
tribute to democratizing projects across a range of arenas.
Rather than construct new accountings to be handed to oth-
ers as solutions or focus on consensus-oriented processes
that mask political differences, this approach favors the plu-
ralizing ethos advocated by agonistic political theorists “ori-
ented towards working on ourselves by working on the prac-
tices and problematizations in which we ﬁnd ourselves” (Tully
2008:16). The aim is to think about how alternative account-
ings—drawing on, inter alia, numbers, narratives, and visual
methods—might be developed as practices of freedom to con-
test neoliberal ideas of who and what counts.
There is considerable scope for synergies between social
anthropologists, critical accountants, and others interested in
challenging audit culture. In addition to critiques such as that
provided by Shore and Wright, ethnographic studies could
provide valuable insights into the self-understandings of dif-
ferent groups in relation to neoliberal/alternative logics (e.g.,
to help specify the parameters of contestation), as well as con-
textual studies aimed at identifying the most effective forms
of resistance and counteraccounts.
Casper Bruun Jensen
cbruunjensen@gmail.com. 5 XI 14
“Audit Culture Revisited” is a tour de force through the state
of audit affairs. Focusing on audit as an encompassing re-
gime of governance (cf. Power 1997), the paper discusses a
plethora of initiatives from private and public organizations.
The general aim is to provide a global diagnosis of audit’s
ailments. Certainly, these negative effects should not be dis-
regarded. Yet, I would suggest that, due to their very signiﬁ-
cance, the critical issues demand more nuanced treatment.
On the one hand, the authors note that “audit practices
work in diverse ways.” On the other hand, in the aggregate,
audit “form[s] an individualizing and totalizing system.” In
the paper, illustrations from the Big Four to quality mea-
surement in higher education are deployed to similar, if not
identical, effect. Taking a page from the sociologists Wendy
Espeland and Michael Sauder (2007), audit instances neo-
liberal governance through numbers; quantiﬁcation rides
roughshod over quality, and professional values suffer across
the board. This paints audit as a purely disruptive and repres-
sive phenomenon, with a one-sidedness that would not be
accepted in most other cases. (Just consider the idea of char-
acterizing kinship or rituals in general in exclusively negative
terms). Whereas one might occasionally complain about not
being able to see the cultural forest for the ethnographic trees,
here the individual trees are largely invisible. Audit takes on
the grim spectacle of a Mirkwood extending globally.
It is worth noting that Michael Power (1994) himself
thought of the audit explosion as a “passing phase,” advising
researchers to look out for “the seeds of a change” (32). En-
couraging attentiveness to the microphysics of audit prac-
tices, this recommendation helps to defuse the sense of en-
compassing power produced by the authors’ image of global
audit culture. It stimulates ethnographic curiosity about au-
dit’s variable manifestations, aims, and consequences.
A rich set of anthropological analyses of audit, not cited in
the paper, moves in this direction (e.g., Hetheringon 2011;
Hull 2012; Riles 2006). Rachel Douglas-Jones’s (2012) study
of medical ethics committees in Southeast Asia exhibits peo-
ple committed to audit for distinctly nonreductive reasons,
such as the achievement of integrity and trust. “Even the most
utilitarian of objects can be charged with emotional value,
whereas the most seemingly pure ‘pulsional’ forces can serve
as utilitarian tools” (Kaufman 2001:116, citing Klossowski
1970). Even audit.
My work with Brit Ross Winthereik (2013) has identiﬁed
the coexistence of numerous audit agendas, none of which are
totalizing, even when their promoters aspired them to be—
by no means always the case. Indeed, like Douglas-Jones, we
found some of the most ardent proponents of audits to be
people lower in the organizational hierarchies, experimenting
with the optimization of practices in order to leverage, rather
than undermine, their own expertise.
But is this emphasis on speciﬁcity and variability not sim-
ply a manner of throwing one’s hands up in despair when
confronted with the totalizing audit system? On the contrary,
I believe that imposing upon audit a coherence and power it
does not seem to have when examined ethnographically it-
self strengthens audit (for a detailed discussion of one of the
authors’ examples, see Jensen 2011). Once audit has been
constructed as a juggernaut, the only feasible response ap-
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pears to be an equally macroscopic critique. Its natural idiom
will be resistance. The general characteristics of this oppo-
sitional ﬁgure is well captured by Barbara Herrnstein Smith
(1988):
The force of the opposition . . . is most evident, perhaps,
in the recurrent struggles between two kinds of calcula-
tion . . . : on the one hand, the kind, so named, that frames
its objective as the efﬁcient arrival at a speciﬁc and read-
ily speciﬁable . . . “bottom-line” . . . andon theotherhand, and
typically in antagonistic relation to the ﬁrst kind, another
calculation, not named as such, that characteristically fore-
grounds and promoted exactly what was ignored by the
ﬁrst. (133)
Exemplifying the latter, “Audit Culture Revisited” aims to
resist the bottom line of audit. Thus, “it seems imperative to
ﬁnd ways to reclaim the space for professionalism that is
placed at risk by the spread of audit culture” and “the most
successful antidote probably lies in collective action and a
reassertion of academic and professional values.”
These are rather vague recommendations, but they raise
speciﬁc questions: Who makes up the collective. And what is
collective action going to be for? Moreover, to the extent that
whatever it is for is adamantly opposed to any logic of mea-
surement, what kind of real promise does it hold? Or, more
generally, “If regimes of truth are inevitably totalitarian, what
remains of emancipatory claims about the best way to order
and govern human beings? How even to endeavor to transform
the present, whatever totalitarian elements it might harbor,
without tapping this danger?” (Brown 2005:101). Perhaps that
danger is best avoided by the ethnographic observation that
not even audit is wholly totalitarian.
Mark Maguire
Department of Anthropology, Maynooth University, Maynooth,
County Kildare, Ireland (mark.h.maguire@nuim.ie). 4 XI 14
New Questions of Evidence
In 2012, an Irish magazine introduced the Dublin-based
director of “government services” at one of the Big Four au-
diting ﬁrms. The executive spoke from expertise in organi-
zational change: transparency and efﬁciency would inevita-
bly ﬂow, he explained, from reengineering state institutions
to be measurably customer focused according to best prac-
tice. The magazine provided another update on the quiet rev-
olution that Shore and Wright have tracked for more than
a decade—the relentless rise of audit culture. But, in this in-
stance, the ideological language was exposed by broader cir-
cumstances. In 2012, the same ﬁrm was sued by the Irish
Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) over its role in audit-
ing Anglo Irish Bank, the collapse of which cost the state
approximately $40 billion, or 20% of GDP. Nine days before
the bank was nationalized, Merrill Lynch gave it a clean bill
of health in a report costing approximately $11 million (in-
cidentally, the IBRC appointed another Big Four ﬁrm as its
auditor). Business as usual.
The recent ﬁnancial crisis called attention to the opaque
world of global actors who audit, produce rankings, indica-
tors, and transparency. When accused of negligence or sharp
practice, they defend themselves with the nineteenth-century
mantra, “We are watchdogs, not bloodhounds.” Yet, as Shore
and Wright note, they overproduce quasiempirical language
and sign their activities as evidence based. As I reﬂect on re-
cent history, questions about evidence spring to mind. The
ofﬁcial inquiry into Irish banking was a toothless process—
as in the blinding of Polyphemus, “Nobody” was to blame—
but it was revealing. The sector was accused of divertingmasses
of risk analysis professionals to deal with international Basel
II standards. Evidence of actual risk became secondary to
mimetic self-regulation indicators derived from abstract quan-
titative models. Anthropology is certainly equipped to study
mimesis, rituals of evidence gathering, and “the magic of
numbers” (Merry 2011:S84). Anthropology must reengage
with questions of evidence and harness some of its most in-
tellectually rewarding concepts as it does so.
Shore and Wright’s article aims to cut to the heart of the
rationales driving and legitimizing so-called audit culture.
Similarly, Sally Engle Merry’s recent Current Anthropology
article “Measuring the World” (2011) examines the contem-
porary plague of indicators and rankings. These articles should
be read together, because the authors provide different ge-
nealogies of audits and indicators that might be produc-
tively brought into dialogue. Shore and Wright begin with the
calculative styles of reasoning born in grading and ranking
at West Point and École Polytechnique before tracking the
rise of scientiﬁc management and new public management.
They show the remarkable resilience of these styles of rea-
soning in the face of numerous failures. But Merry’s geneal-
ogy of indicators offers to them interesting challenges. She
draws on historian Mary Poovey (1998) to explore the rise of
“the modern fact,” the ostensibly neutral and systematic basis
of statistical and governmental reasoning by experts. The
nineteenth-century shift from moral knowledge to statistical-
governmental knowledge may have provoked merciless sar-
casm from Charles Dickens, but it also provoked important
scientiﬁc debates. “Statistics,” William Robertson argued, “is
not even a department of human knowledge; it is merely a
form of knowledge—a mode of arranging and stating facts”
(quoted in Poovey 1998:316; see also Poovey 1993). But the
problem here exceeds the questionable evidential basis of
governmental knowledge. We must attend also to the magic
and necromancy inherent in rendering into numbers the
characteristics of populations. Many nineteenth-century stat-
isticians eschewed “causes” yet found mesmerizing patterns
in data. William Cook Taylor stared at lists of murders in
France until he saw “a certain sympathy or principle of imi-
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tation” (1835:113). What is at stake in these early examples is
the potential power of data qua data.
Today, as nurseries and even mortuaries face audits,
rankings, and indicators, questions about evidence are fore-
grounded. Similarly, in my own ﬁeld of security research, one
may note the rise and resilience of scenarios and foresight-
ing by experts. Quasiempirical yet ostensibly evidence-based,
quasicorporate yet rampant across society, these forms of
knowledge demand anthropological attention. Shore and
Wright have provided an important service here by revisiting
audit culture and its (perverse) effects. One may, however, add
to their ongoing work by highlighting a broader genealogy
and what that makes possible. For instance, they note the
Amazon UK warehouses in which stressed workers are con-
trolled by omniscient time-and-motion technology. But to-
day, data qua data is taking on new forms scarcely imaginable
in the past. Today, such workers are controlled, measured,
and ranked as coded data that must respond to algorithms
scraping “big data” for magical insights into consumer be-
haviors. It was a broader genealogy that provoked Gilles De-
leuze to picture “transmutable or transformable coded con-
ﬁgurations of a single business where the only people left are
administrators” (1995:181).
Sally Engle Merry
Department of Anthropology, New York University, 25 Waverly
Place, New York, New York 10003, U.S.A. (sally.merry@nyu.edu).
26 XI 14
In this article, Chris Shore and Susan Wright offer an in-
sightful analysis of a new mode of power that is reshaping
governance: the reliance on numbers and audits. The power
of quantiﬁcation has become the subject of analysis in a
variety of domains, from global governance, economic devel-
opment, and nongovernmental organizations to local cam-
paigns against violence against women or environmental de-
struction. Shore and Wright, prominent theorists in this ﬁeld,
provide a historical perspective on the formation of audit cul-
ture and its use in several domains, particularly higher edu-
cation. They focus on the effects of rankings and audits on
higher education systems in the United States, United King-
dom, Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand, but the effects
and problems of audits and testing are found in K–12 schools
in the United States as well. At both educational levels, the
expansion of audit practices has generated resistance.
One of the signiﬁcant contributions of this article is its
effort to grapple with the meaning of the term culture in the
widely used phrase “audit culture.” I have written about “in-
dicator culture,” a closely related term that refers to the use
of measurement systems as taken-for-granted ways of as-
sessing truth and making decisions (Merry and Coutin 2014),
but this raises similar questions about the status of the cul-
ture concept. As the authors helpfully point out, they are not
using the term to describe a type of society such as “feudal
society” but instead a set of dispositions and practices and
a rationality of governance. Audit culture refers to situations
where “auditing has become a central organizing principle
of society.” The challenge is to see audit as both a set of
techniques and practices used in certain situations for pur-
poses of governance and as a mode of thinking and anal-
ysis that makes particular political actions seem reasonable
and justiﬁed. The capacity of these techniques to render acts
of power rational and without question is the core charac-
teristic of their power. Thus, it is the cultural dimension of
quantiﬁcation that is of particular importance in understand-
ing how it works as a form of power. This article makes a
signiﬁcant contribution to unpacking the role of culture, but
it warrants even more attention.
I have approached the cultural dimension of quantiﬁca-
tion through an analysis of two key effects that numbers pro-
duce: a knowledge effect and a governance effect. In other
words, numbers make the world knowable in particular ways,
and this form of knowledge contributes to governance by
providing the evidence that underlines political decisions.
Both effects have cultural dimensions: knowledge itself is
shaped through cultural assumptions, and there are cultural
understandings of the way political decisions are made.
It is this process that Shore and Wright are discussing with
relationship to audits in higher education. The audit systems
they describe endeavor to make scholarly accomplishment
visible through counting in order to allocate resources and
positions. Shore and Wright’s analysis provides valuable in-
sight into the way individuals and organizations react to,
manipulate, and resist audits. While this perspective is clearly
critical, it is also useful to examine how audit systems are
produced in the ﬁrst place, what interests they serve, and
how issues are rendered countable. As they suggest, political
and economic concerns such as government desires to save
money or auditing ﬁrms’ interest in business shape audits.
Focusing on production as well as effects also means asking
how the designers decide what to count, what models they
adopt, how they cope with limited or missing data, and what
underlying theories of social change shape their choice of
what to measure. All of these decisions affect what kinds of
knowledge are produced. For example, Summer Wood and I
studied the pilot test of an indicator system for measuring
children’s rights in Tanzania that had been developed by in-
ternational experts. We found signiﬁcant differences in the
measurability of dimensions of children’s rights depending
on what had previously been measured and how aligned the
categories were with local understandings of children’s lives
(Merry and Wood 2015).
These studies raise the issue of the tension between global
and local forms of classiﬁcation and counting. Even in the
measurement of higher education, when governments use au-
dits to measure their own educational systems, they impose
uniform categories on a varied set of institutions. The prob-
lem is exacerbated in global university ranking schemes. How
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does the need to render categories and counts commensurable
across classes and regions ﬂatten difference and ignore con-
text? Do categories of enumeration make sense in local con-
texts? Do forms of global measurement created in the global
North generally reinforce the power differentials between rich
and poor countries, as they do in the global ranking of uni-
versities or comparative educational tests such as PISA? Shore
and Wright have given us the tools to examine these critical
questions.
Michael Sauder and Wendy Espeland
Department of Sociology, University of Iowa, W140 Seashore Hall,
Iowa City, Iowa 52242, U.S.A./Department of Sociology, North-
western University, 1810 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, Illinois 60208,
U.S.A. (wendyespeland@gmail.com). 21 I 15
On the Audit Trail
Should we be surprised that ISIS publishes an annual report?
Or that al-Neba (The Report) contains more than 400 pages
of performance metrics assembled by area, type of attack
(e.g., apostates run over, IEDs delivered by motorcycle, as-
sassinations), and month of operations?1 Whether to dem-
onstrate strength, secure funding, or to assert its legitimacy
as a centralized institution, that ISIS invests the resources to
produce such a document suggests the power and penetra-
tion of the audit as a pervasive cultural form. The power and
proliferation of audits is the theme of Shore and Wright’s
valuable and timely article. Few today are immune to the
scrutiny delivered by audits, and Shore and Wright offer a
valuable range of examples, orienting questions and classiﬁ-
cations of consequences to develop a framework for theo-
rizing audit culture. We brieﬂy outline a few ideas about how
future work might use this framework to improve our un-
derstanding of the rise, diffusion, and differentiation of ac-
countability measures.
Shore and Wright suggest that a key question in analyzing
audits is why and under what conditions individuals, orga-
nizations, and governments adopt audit practices. As they
rightly argue, their spread is far more complicated and con-
sequential than “policy transfer.” Teasing out the motives
and mechanisms that propel audit practices is challenging.
The Gates Foundation’s famous formula of “no metrics, no
money” has propelled the spread of auditing practices in
philanthropy and research around the globe. But this type of
direct coercion is only part of the story. Certainly demand is
produced and manipulated by strategic players. As Shore
and Wright suggest, the new industries of measurement that
produce and disseminate technologies of auditing and rank-
ing deserve far more attention than they are receiving from
scholars. Aside from the seminal work of some scholars of
accounting or the history of science, few have explained their
growing inﬂuence. The Big Four accounting ﬁrms offer a
dazzling array of professional services to clients in nearly
every nation and are among the most enthusiastic producers
of indicators. But their formal role as auditors in the con-
ventional sense is now eclipsed by their other consulting ser-
vices, which incorporate ﬁnance, law, and management, and
their almost 800,000 employees are key players in the glob-
alizing of audit culture.
And yet the demand for auditing as the hallmark of ratio-
nality and accountability is not only about selling new prod-
ucts. Their proliferation takes many forms, including the re-
purposing of established auditing practices. For example,
much has been written about the role of credit rating agen-
cies in the recent ﬁnancial crisis, but the long history of credit
ratings (an “old industry” of accountability metrics) reveals
a complicated trajectory of diffusion. Dun and Bradstreet be-
gan evaluating the creditworthiness of small businesses in the
mid-nineteenth century. Moody’s ﬁrst rated bonds in 1909.
These rating services were paid for by lenders and investors
who wanted to identify trustworthy borrowers. Credit ratings
were ﬁrst given regulatory standing during the Great Depres-
sion by bank regulators desperate to save insolvent banks. In the
1970s, photocopy machines, by making it easy to share credit
reports, helped undermine intellectual property rights and so
facilitated a new business model. Instead of having users pay,
now it was the borrowers who paid for their own bond ratings,
ushering in all the predictable conﬂict of interests. With the
invention of over-the-counter derivatives in the 1990s, contract
writers needed to include some measure of counterparty risk.
Once again, credit ratings offered an easy, defensible solution.
As the uses of credit ratings grew, as they were written into
regulations and contracts, as they deﬁned derivatives and
evaluated governments, they became the global infrastructure
through which risk was apprehended and manufactured.
Hardly anyone is untouched by their inﬂuence. As Shore and
Wright urge, careful and close-to-the-ground studies of organi-
zations and sectors such as these can provide new insights into
the role that producers play in the creation and reproduction
of audit culture.
Shore and Wright make the important point that mea-
sures and rankings can render the political mundane. Part
of the particular authority of numbers, part of what distin-
guishes them from other symbols, is their long associations
with objectivity and rigor and our assumptions about their
universality. In addition to the important dimensions of au-
dit culture that Shore and Wright highlight, the distinctive
properties of numbers warrant further theorizing. The capac-
ity of numbers to simplify so radically; simultaneously inte-
grate and distinguish disparate objects, people, or practices; or-
ganize comparisons; subvert established categorization; travel
so easily—all of these qualities—makes them specialized forms
of knowing and constituting.
As is the mark of stimulating work, Shore and Wright
leave us wanting more. What is the nature of the coherence1. We thank Emmanuel Didier for sharing this article (Bilger 2014).
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or convergence that permits us to speak of a global audit
culture? How might we better develop and apply Wittgen-
stein’s intriguing idea of family resemblances to these mea-
sures? Does Foucault’s conception of governmentality require
substantial revision in order to account for the dominance
of audit culture? Most important of all, perhaps, is the difﬁ-
cult question, can the expanding inﬂuence of audit culture be
resisted?
Gavin Smith
gavin.gav@gmail.com. 20 XI 14
This article is an incisive gathering together of the vital work
that Shore and Wright have been doing on, and for, the
academic community over the past few years. In what fol-
lows, I want to take the critical spirit of their work and ex-
tend it. They argue that the ways in which people are obliged
to comply with the gathering of data ostensibly so that better
information will lead to a better-functioning society are in
fact forms of regulation, which they term “audit culture.”
I am uneasy with the cultural determinism that results.
Rather than asking whether audit culture “has become a cen-
tral organizing principle of society,” I wonder whether it is
not a symptom of another, more fundamental organizing
principle of capitalism that has been so modiﬁed as to oblige
us to rethink how the securing of surpluses occurs and thence
how this logic pervades governance.
Emergent from an earlier era of government and church
patronage, the secular university was shaped as an institution
coeval with the rise of liberal democracy, industrial capital-
ism, and the rationalization of empire. As each of these proj-
ects became overlain on the other, so they overdetermined
the academic enterprise, giving a certain authoritative auton-
omy to something called the “university.” Understood in this
way, the question arises as to how changes in these three ele-
ments might reconstitute the academy and education more
broadly. I will conﬁne myself to one element of the domi-
nance of ﬁnance in the reproduction of capital that relates to
audit.
This results from the demands made on companies en-
gaged in production and its ancillaries to prioritize high re-
turns to shareholders over the channeling of surpluses to-
ward reinvestment and, hence, increased relative surplus value.
One result is a shift in the form information takes in different
spheres of capital: from planning for the future of industrial
capital relying on the use of statistics and the like to ﬁnance
that garners proﬁts by trading among possible futures (Almore
2013; Cooper 2010). An oxymoron, “risk management” is a
mystiﬁcation that produces an actuality. It seeks to secure proﬁts
by eliminating or reducing the contingency of risk, while sub-
scribing to the Hayekian myth of competition, in which the
contingency of risk is the basis of entrepreneurial advantage
and, hence, proﬁt. As Ouroussoff (2010) puts it, “systematic
elimination of contingency has taken the place of risk as the
vital force underlying capital accumulation and expansion”
(44). In the War on Wall Street, she describes audit as the
prime weapon of engagement.
What is the form information takes so as to be passed
through this audit channel? Phenomena in the real world are
broken down, disaggregating one element from what appears
to be an entirely embedded set—one department from the
rest of a company, let us say, its ﬁnancing department; one
individual from a household family, let us say, a student with
a loan—and so on. Each of these, taken on its own, can be
given a risk assessment—the probability of success or failure.
But the tradable value lies in reaggregating what are now ap-
parently entirely distinct risk phenomena so as to produce a
packaged security. What matters is not any one feature—a
successful ﬁnancing department or a failed loan repayment—
but the relations among them, and “what can be done for
loans can be done for many facets of . . . social life” (Bryan
and Rafferty 2006:203).
It is not that the uncertainties we face today are greater
than before, it is that we now have instruments that appear
to turn incalculable uncertainty into calculable and, hence,
tradable risk (Knight 1921). What is being sought here is not
security as such but to make movement and volatility trad-
able through a ratio of risk to security for enhancing proﬁt.
The use of ﬁnancial instruments to manage risks in the mar-
ket (rather than social or political rules) are a form of regu-
lation, not its absence (Bryan and Rafferty 2006), and as such,
they are extended into society as a whole via, among other
things, audit culture. As I note elsewhere, “Dealing in the pres-
ent with a variety of expectations for possibilities in the fu-
ture through ﬁnancial instruments like derivatives (forwards,
futures, options, etc.) means hedging in terms of risk, rather
than envisioning some of the interconnected elements of a
controllable space as predictable and hence susceptible to plan-
ning. And this in turn changes the way in which the social is
envisaged” (Smith 2014:195, emphasis added ).
Shore and Wright have provided us with an array of in-
stances in which audit culture provides the lens for such a
vision. In doing so, they have performed an invaluable ser-
vice by providing us with some of the elements we will need
to generate a cohesive program to resist both the discursive
(cultural) and the institutional (social) manifestations of such
regulation.
Katherine Teghtsoonian
Faculty of Human and Social Development, University of Victoria,
P.O. Box 1700, STN CSC, Victoria, British Columbia V8W 2Y2,
Canada (ktex@uvic.ca). 8 XII 14
One of the things I really like about this contribution by Cris
Shore and Susan Wright is its generative quality. Each sec-
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tion of the article offers thought-provoking insights into the
governing technologies that have become pervasive within
universities and opens up further lines of inquiry that prom-
ise both scholarly and strategic insights into the operation
and effects of these practices. For example, the authors use-
fully draw our attention to how university managers’ engage-
ment with audit culture is mediated through their relation-
ship to governments. We see this in their account of the
Australian minister for higher education’s rejection of a sys-
tem for using journal rankings to grade research publications
when it became apparent to him that the measure was be-
ing transformed (in his view, inappropriately) into a target by
university administrators. Here, and in the Danish case ex-
ample, there is evidence of government’s capacity to set and
change the rules of the game in ways that are generally not
open to managers within university settings, however senior
they may be and whatever hopes they may harbor about
shaping policy decisions. Developments like these invite criti-
cal reﬂection on the relationship between senior university
management and policy makers and bureaucrats within gov-
ernment, as well as further consideration of the mechanisms
through which those located toward the top of organizational
hierarchies are governed, even as they govern others.
Shore and Wright nod to the value of such analysis in
their discussion of the likely role played by the vice chan-
cellor’s own key performance indicators in the struggles at
the University of Auckland outlined in their article. Their
point about the potential beneﬁts of greater transparency
with regard to the incentives to which senior management
within universities orient their activities is well taken. Such
transparency would facilitate critical analysis by social scien-
tists of the speciﬁc mechanisms through which the govern-
ing technologies associated with audit culture enter univer-
sity settings and—crucially—could usefully inform practical
action by the academic staff organizations to which they
belong. Indeed, as underlined by the authors’ discussion of
the pathways traveled by practices of measurement and
ranking in other instances and eras, there is much to be
learned through an analysis of precisely how contemporary
practices of measurement, ranking, and audit travel into and
within universities and how these practices—and their ef-
fects—are modiﬁed as they are translated into different or-
ganizational and political contexts.
A related point, implicit in the authors’ juxtaposition of
their three case examples, is that “managers” within univer-
sity settings make up a heterogeneous group differentiated
by whether their appointment is primarily academic (e.g.,
department leaders and deans) or administrative (e.g., man-
agers in human resources or ﬁnance departments) and by
their position within the organizational hierarchy. There
may thus be analytic mileage to be gained in unpacking the
various ways in which different groups of managers are sit-
uated relative to each other, to academic staff, and to those
to whom they report or are accountable. In reﬂecting on how
the authors’ analysis of the governing technologies adopted
by these diversely located managers might be developed fur-
ther, I also wondered about the effects of claiming that rank-
ing practices generate a “shift [in] power away from profes-
sionals and onto managers and administrators.” Arguably,
this characterization risks occluding the mechanisms through
which the practices of managers and administrators are them-
selves governed, as well as the potential for those who are
managed to push back nevertheless.
The authors do offer instructive examples of challenges to
the governing practices that make up audit culture, and the
article is replete with examples of the inefﬁciencies and other
problematic effects that these have generated, both within
universities and elsewhere. At the same time, these impor-
tant insights sit in a sometimes awkward tension with other
elements of the discussion that tend to constitute audit cul-
ture as a secure accomplishment, successful in its “totalizing”
ambitions and alignments. This tension may well reﬂect the
unevenness of the effects of the practices being scrutinized,
but the puzzle of the faithfulness of governments and man-
agers to these in the face of their many manifest failures
remains to be solved. In fact, “perverse effects” appear to be
so pervasive that it may be worth reconsidering their in-
clusion as a separate category within the authors’ ﬁvefold ty-
pology and to insist, instead, that they routinely arise within
and are integral to the other four categories of effects. In any
event, one lesson that can be drawn from the empirical ex-
amples presented is the efﬁcacy of collective responses to the
claims of audit culture. Since both scholarly research and
informal observation suggest that many transgressions man-
ifest, instead, in and through individual(ized) practices of
refusal, it may be productive to assess whether and how
these can be “scaled up” and mobilized along existing or to-
be-constituted pathways connecting different locales, just as
the practices of audit culture have been.
Renita Thedvall
Department of Social Anthropology and Score (Stockholm Centre
for Organizational Research), Stockholm University, Sweden
(renita.thedvall@score.su.se). 12 XII 14
Cris Shore and Susan Wright’s contribution to the audit cul-
ture debate raises some important issues, including a theo-
retical framework for understanding audit culture today. The
topic of audit culture is well worth revisiting since it is not
diminishing as a phenomenon but rather accelerating. In fact,
auditing, in many ways, guides behavior and thinking even
more now than when in its infancy since it has become such
a totalizing governance system in many places across the
globe. The expansion of auditing as a practice has emerged
in response to new control systems, in which organizational
performance has become understood in need of scrutiny,
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evaluation, and veriﬁcation in the form of numbers and in-
dicators. Virtually all organizations utilize and rely on audits
to articulate the use of ﬁnancial and human resources. In this
world of audits, it makes sense to discuss in terms of audit
culture (Shore and Wright 2000) rather than audit cultures
(Strathern 2000c) in the plural—not denying local differences
to this phenomenon but nonetheless highlighting the uni-
formity in the system. In their article, Shore and Wright
present a thought-provoking framework for understanding
the general effects that auditing has on the governance of so-
ciety and the organization of people and their activities.
Shore and Wright build on Sally Engle Merry’s (2011)
work on indicators producing knowledge effects and gov-
ernance effects and develop ﬁve “audit effects.” The “do-
maining effect” pertains to the fact that audit reshape its en-
vironment. There are numerous studies within the ﬁeld of
accounting, for example, that show how performance audit-
ing inﬂuences the behavior of organizations and their em-
ployees (Butterﬁeld, Edwards, and Woodall 2004; Diefenbach
2009; Hood and Peters 2004). Shore and Wright give the ex-
ample of the Danish university system for evaluating research
performance and how audit technologies give rise to changes
in academics’ publication strategies. This is also the standard
within the Swedish university system, which has pushed re-
searchers’ publication habits toward monographs and jour-
nal articles at the expense of edited volumes. This practice is
also visible in the US academia but maybe for other reasons.
The “classiﬁcatory effect” pertains to the fact that statisti-
cal classiﬁcations shape our ideas and mold our lives, trans-
forming subjects’ and organizations’ positions (Hacking 1986;
Porter 1995). They determine who and what is included and
excluded, exercising power. I might add, from my own work,
the awareness of the classiﬁcatory effects among the pro-
ducers of indicators. I have examined the production of in-
dicators in the context of the European Union, where mem-
ber states negotiated what indicators to use when measuring
quality in work (Thedvall 2012). The EU member states’ rep-
resentatives, the bureaucrats, were governed by the bureau-
cratic logic of political neutrality and objectivity. At the same
time, the members were representatives of their respective
states and tried to argue for indicators to measure quality
in work that would make their states look good in the EU
comparisons of member states. This spoke of a logic of cul-
tural intimacy, to borrow Michael Herzfeld’s (1997) term,
whereby member states kept culturally intimate certain results
of nation-state policy that were not in their best interest to
have displayed in the context of the EU.
A third effect is the “individualizing and totalizing effect.”
Building on Foucault’s (1979) notion of biopower/biopolitics,
Shore and Wright explain how auditing techniques discipline
across three scales: individual, organizational, and sectorial.
The use of performance indicators to measure, for example,
the international standing of universities not only disciplines
individual academics in focusing on what counts, but the
whole university sector is restructured around indicators and
university rankings. A fourth effect is the “governance ef-
fect,” which Shore and Wright stress as the increased use of
indicators and numbers to make individuals and organiza-
tions accountable to governments, the public, funders, and
so forth. In audit culture, indicators are often treated as rep-
resenting reality objectively. In other words, performance in-
dicators are understood as making activities transparent, en-
abling politicians, bureaucrats, and other citizens to observe
and evaluate the effectiveness of organizations. The results are
therefore widely used as bases for decisions.
This brings us the ﬁnal effect, the “perverse effect.” Shore
and Wright give plenty of arguments for the perverse effects
of the audit model, including the body counts during the
Vietnam War and the indicators used to measure the per-
formance of Amazon’s “pickers” and Danish academics alike
that drive individuals to overperform. If I may add, another
perverse effect of audit culture is the integrated distrust built
into the system. Rather than building trust, which was the
original motivation, auditing often leads to more auditing
(Power 1999). Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006) discuss in
terms of “distrust spirals.” Paradoxically, then, the prevalence
of auditing techniques and rankings often result in linger-
ing uncertainty. I fully agree with Shore’s and Wright’s ﬁnal
words that we need to reassert academic and professional
judgments and strive for action.
Reply
We welcome these thoughtful and constructive comments
and are particularly pleased to engage in conversation with
people from such a wide range of disciplines, including so-
ciology, accounting, information and media studies, and po-
litical science, as well as anthropology. We identify three main
points arising from their comments. The ﬁrst concerns a se-
ries of questions about the nature, spread, and societal im-
plications of audit culture. Why has audit continued to ad-
vance despite its widely documented failures? How do the
logics and practices of audit spread, and why do people con-
tinue to adopt and promote them? And what can be done to
challenge and resist its seemingly unstoppable expansion? The
second main point addresses questions of theory and how we
should conceptualize or analyze audit culture. The third point
concerns issues of methodology and perspective and can be
summed up in the question, what does anthropology bring to
the study of audit?
On a more reﬂexive note, we acknowledge that repre-
senting audit culture as a force with expansionary dynamics
runs the risk of reifying an otherwise complex set of political
and social tendencies. That is contrary to our intention, and
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Sally Merry captures our aim superbly when she states that
“the challenge is to see audit as both a set of techniques and
practices . . . and as a mode of thinking and analysis that
makes particular political actions seem reasonable and jus-
tiﬁed.” To do that, we need to identify and name audit as a
social and cultural phenomenon. This is the ﬁrst step toward
understanding how audit rationalities and techniques exert
power by normalizing and naturalizing particular disposi-
tions and ways of governing and being. As most of the
commentators suggest, audit culture is becoming increasingly
prevalent and intrusive in people’s lives, and it merits serious
anthropological investigation.
Nature, Spread, and Societal Implications of Audit Culture
Our commentators provide three examples of why audit cul-
ture continues to colonize new social domains. These range
from acts of coercion to boasting and concealment. Sauder
and Espeland illustrate the coercive mechanism employed
by the Gates Foundation with their mantra, “no metrics, no
money.” This compels recipients of their philanthropy to
frame their case in decontextualized numbers. The same au-
thors provide a second example of how audit has expanded
as a means for an organization to vaunt its achievements. The
terrorist organization ISIS now uses the format of a for-proﬁt
corporation’s annual report to brag about its “performance”
in the territories it occupies. “Bombings,” “knife murders,”
“cities taken over,” “apostates run over,” and other atrocities
are all clinically enumerated in statistical tables of “opera-
tions” per geographical district (Bilger 2014:10). The third
example, by Mark Maguire, illustrates the opposite tendency.
When the Anglo Irish Bank collapsed in March 2008 (at a
cost of $40 billion, equivalent to 20% of Ireland’s GDP), an
ofﬁcial inquiry into the auditing carried out by the Irish Bank
Resolution Corporation, Merrill Lynch, and one of the Big
Four auditing ﬁrms found that “nobody” was to blame. This
is a vivid case of a wider tendency in the aftermath of the
banking crisis—and the subsequent Libor rate-ﬁxing scan-
dal—in which bank CEOs were exonerated from blame on
the grounds that they were unaware of their employees’ ac-
tivities (Economist 2009).
The answer to the second question—how audit advances
and why people engage with these auditing processes—is more
complex. Vered Amit argues that it is largely self-interest that
drives people’s engagement with audit and suggests that new
auditing regimes are most likely to gain compliance when
at least some of those subject to it believe it will improve
their (social or material) standing. This implies that individ-
uals are able to exercise choice over whether to comply with
the mandates of audit and accountability. By contrast, Judy
Brown emphasizes the systemic logic at work and the way
in which audit practices become sedimented in governance
structures to the point where people cannot see how things
could ever be different. Even if they do perceive what is at
stake, they are often reluctant to challenge authority for fear
of being labeled as opposed to “accountability,” “efﬁciency,”
and “good governance.” Both of these viewpoints are valid,
and our quest is to ﬁnd ways of combining them.
This raises our third question: what is the space for re-
sistance against audit? Vered Amit’s concept of “adminis-
trative overreach” may have some utility, but in many cases
(including the University of Auckland example) senior man-
agers made proposals and offers that sought to divide the
workforce. In this case, academics who accepted Individual
Employment Agreements were given a pay raise. Although
the union was ultimately successful, these were very difﬁcult
conditions in which to mobilize collective opposition to the
new employment contracts. An alternative way of thinking
about resistance comes from Sally Merry’s observation that
there is often a tension between global and local forms of
classiﬁcation and counting. We try to develop that gap into a
space for potential resistance by arguing for a reassertion of
professional values and for evaluating organizations in their
own terms. However, we accept Judy Brown’s criticism that
some professional values (e.g., those of neoclassical econo-
mists, HR managers, and much of the accounting industry)
are often part of the problem and that when for-proﬁt or-
ganizations are evaluated in their own terms, it is for max-
imization of value to shareholders. Brown points the way
to alternative forms of accounting that are pluralistic, con-
tested, and inherently more democratic. We applaud this sug-
gestion and would welcome its introduction into universities
and other public institutions as a way to create more equita-
ble, sustainable, dialogic, and trustworthy organizations.
Theorizing and Explaining Audit Culture
Gavin Smith makes the important point, with which we
concur, that audit culture is not a determining principle of
society but rather a symptom of contemporary capitalism.
As we argued, the core of audit culture lies in the application
of the methods and principles of ﬁnancial control to ever-
wider areas of culture and society, in what might be termed
the “ﬁnancialization” of everyday life. Smith provides an ex-
emplary demonstration of how numbers and indicators are
used to disaggregate and disembody phenomena (such as
happened with student loans and subprime mortgages) and
reassemble them in packages that are tradeable in new forms
of capitalism. Audit culture is both an instrument of and
instrumental in this process. This point is nicely illustrated
by Mark Maguire, who shows how the fetishization of num-
bers and associated “rituals of veriﬁcation” (Power 1997)
blind capitalist institutions (banks, insurance companies, ac-
countancy ﬁrms, etc.) to the actual risks of their operations.
In other words, the focus on data qua data has become in-
creasingly detached from the material world. It is not only
consumers who are, as Maguire elegantly puts it, increasingly
“controlled, measured, and ranked as coded data that must
respond to algorithms scraping ‘big data’ for magical insights,”
but also the workforce.
440 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 3, June 2015
This content downloaded from 158.223.166.062 on February 15, 2019 04:29:49 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Another important theoretical point is raised by Judy
Brown, who asks what is marginalized by audit. Drawing
on insights from private-sector accounting, she points out
that “market-like” models of accountability and transpar-
ency create externalities that, as in all capitalist enterprises,
lie outside the scope and concern of the organization. To her
list of social justice, ecological sustainability, work intensiﬁ-
cation, increased inequality, and antidemocratic practices,
we would add increased “responsibilization” of the company’s
workforce.
Both Maguire and Merry raise important questions about
the genealogy of audit. We welcome Maguire’s suggestion to
bring into dialogue different histories of the rise of audit and
accounting technologies. The advance of audit culture and
calculative styles of reasoning have many possible genealo-
gies, most of which can be traced to the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries (or earlier) and the rise of science, Enlight-
enment rationalism, and the new world order created by
mercantile and industrial capitalism. Merry argues that, while
numbers and “facts” have both knowledge effects and gov-
ernance effects, it is also important to consider how these are
produced, who designs them, what underlying assumptions
about society shape the choice of what to measure, how they
deal with missing data, and what interests they serve. We can-
not follow these lines of inquiry here, but they certainly pro-
vide a useful agenda for future research in this ﬁeld.
Methodology and Perspectives
What can anthropology bring to this ﬁeld of inquiry? Our
paper was an attempt to open up some avenues of inquiry
and probe the underlying rationalities and practices of audit
and accounting and the way these have become increasingly
dominant features of contemporary organizations and gov-
ernance. As Thedvall summarizes clearly, we did this by
identifying and analyzing ﬁve of the main effects of audit on
individuals, institutions, and society. Katherine Teghtsoon-
ian makes the interesting observation that our empirical ex-
amples show that our ﬁfth, the “perverse effect,” is evident in
each of the other categories and therefore should probably
be integrated as a component of all the other four effects.
This is a useful point as it illustrates both the unpredict-
ability of auditing but also its intransigence and impervi-
ousness to criticism—even from its own “masters.” Like the
genie released from the bottle, audit is a force that is hard to
contain or control. We have elsewhere explored this kind
of “runaway effect” of policy in new regimes of governance
(Shore and Wright 2011). However, as both Maguire and
Merry suggest, anthropology can also use its core concepts of
magic and ritual to analyze this phenomenon.
While some might argue that to turn audit into an object
of study is to reify it and present it as something uniform
and monolithic, our ethnographic examples and those of-
fered by the commentators clearly show that this is not the
case. Our project is not to reduce audit to a simple set of
structures or principles; rather, we aim to identify the com-
mon rationalities of audit, the diversity—and perversity—of
its processes and outcomes, and the complexities of its “do-
maining effects.” In short, we are exploring both the con-
ditions that promote audit and the worlds that audits create.
Casper Bruun Jensen chastises our critique for being nega-
tive and one-sided and for portraying audit culture as uni-
formly repressive and totalizing. As the remarks of other
commentators suggest, this is far from an accurate depic-
tion. To observe that audit has totalizing effects is not to ar-
gue that there is a monolithic “global audit culture.” Jensen
both misunderstands our Foucauldian use of the term “to-
talizing” as well as our anthropological use of the word “cul-
ture” as a process and space of continual negotiation and
contestation. Audit technologies have simultaneous totaliz-
ing and individualizing effects and work by interpellating
individuals as political subjects. He himself exempliﬁes our
argument when he refers to people lower in organizational
hierarchies becoming the ardent proponents of audits in or-
der to leverage their own expertise. Vered Amit also observes
that differently positioned people with different vested in-
terests respond to audit technologies in different ways. As
Teghtsoonian notes, different kinds of managers and gov-
ernment ofﬁcials are also governed and made accountable
by these technologies of accountability.
Conclusion
It is clearly a challenge to develop an anthropological anal-
ysis that encompasses both the systematic and individual
dynamics of such a large-scale process of transformation as
the spread of audit culture. We thank our commentators for
their constructive observations and suggestions, which are
enormously helpful in elaborating this ﬁeld of inquiry.
—Cris Shore and Susan Wright
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